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I. Introduction  
Water management provides a critical lens onto the development process.1 For the last 
several centuries, improvements in clean water and sanitation have contributed to better 
health and increased life expectancies. Currently, however, developing countries seem 
unable to make much progress in bringing these benefits of development to significant 
sectors of their citizens. Water coverage is incomplete and water is of uneven quality. Just 
as serious, however, are the environmental impacts of water extraction, untreated sewage 
disposal, and the depletion of water sources through excessive withdrawals and pollution.  
To resolve this, the World Bank and other development organizations strongly 
encourage decentralization and privatization of water and sanitation services, which is said 
to produce more efficient service delivery by local authorities or private companies, while 
generating a more efficient and equitable allocation as well (Thobani 1997; Mumme and 
Brown 2002; Larson 2002; World Bank 1996). Opponents of privatization, however, argue 
that issues of equity, transparency, and stakeholder participation are lacking as 
governments adopt a private-sector-type business approach, without consultation with 
water users, and without appropriate mechanisms for public participation in decision-
making (WWAP 2003, p 30).  
In this research report, we present a framework for the analysis of the social 
appropriation of water based upon the concept of the New Culture of Water. Using that 
framework, we review the Mexican water sector in light of a set of original case studies. 
Although privatization might have some role to play in improving the performance of 
certain functions of water management agencies, it has clearly not proved superior to the 
public agencies we review. More importantly, however, the privatization solution has 
proved incapable of tackling the very serious problems of environmental destruction and 
the over-exploitation of finite water sources that plague the country. Our review of water 
management in Mexico, therefore, sheds light on some of the contradictions of a 
development process that is far from sustainable.  
 
II. The analytical framework: The New Culture of Water  
A. The New Culture of Water  
The concept of a New Culture of Water (NCW) grew out of a major Spanish social 
movement opposed to the national water policy of the José Maria Aznar government (1999-
2004) that proposed an ambitious infrastructure program to build large dams and other 
public works that would facilitate the large-scale transfer of water from the relatively well- 
endowed watersheds of northeastern Spain to the semi-arid south.2 The NCW offers a 
                                                 
1 Not long ago, “development” was one of the major discourses organizing academic work on international 
affairs. Now, “globalization” seems to have displaced it in the titles of books, articles, and even university 
research centers interested in processes of social and economic change. Discussing water in the context of 
development, reinforces its role as a sin qua non for the progressive improvement of human welfare and 
people’s capabilities. 
2 Its significance in political and social analysis and action was recognized in 2003, when one of its founding 
members, Pedro Arrojo-Agudo of the University of Zaragoza, was awarded the prestigious Goldman Prize for 
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dramatic contrast with the conventional approach to water management that takes water 
demand for granted and promotes supply-side solutions through large public works 
programs. According to the NCW, large infrastructure projects reflect a vision of water 
service that ignores the social and environmental impact of water extraction and enriches 
specific industrial and political sectors of the society. The alternative vision of the NCW 
starts from an integrated sustainable development model that evaluates policy proposals 
affecting the social appropriation of water in terms of limited water availability, social 
justice considerations, and an appreciation of the multiple environmental values of water.  
Because of the deleterious environmental, social, and intergenerational justice 
impacts of trans-basin water transfers and aquifer depletion, the NCW suggests that 
regional development must be designed to take into account the availability of water in its 
own watershed. An essential feature of the NCW, therefore, is the emphasis on the demand 
side of water management, including a clear view of the impact of agriculture and other 
competing, non-domestic uses on resource availability. Going beyond the traditional 
supply-focused strategies, however, requires serious reconsideration of basic concepts such 
as demand itself – which is usually conceptualized as an independent variable that the water 
manager must simply satisfy. Redefining that concept as a variable dependent on multiple 
institutional factors, especially price, opens up a vista with multiple alternative solutions 
(Jiménez-Torrecilla and Martínez-Gil 2003).  
Alternative strategies such as modernizing the physical infrastructure of water 
distribution networks in cities – which currently lose at least one-third of the water (US and 
European data) that passes through them – and improving systems for domestic and 
industrial water use, could increase availability much less expensively than mega-projects 
while also contributing to ecosystem conservation and rehabilitation. Similarly, agriculture 
is a very inefficient user, with estimates of loses of more than half the water it employs; 
modernizing irrigation systems and implementing new production technologies could also 
free up significant amounts of water at less cost than mega-projects, with important gains 
for costs and productivity. In Spain, even desalinizing sea water and aggressive sewage 
water treatment and recycling would be cheaper than transferring rivers across watershed 
boundaries, at the expense of estuaries, deltas, wetlands, biodiversity, and the people living 
in and using those ecosystems (Jiménez-Torrecilla and Martínez-Gil 2003).  
Because water is a regionally-limited resource, the NCW also clarifies the need to 
make a social as well as an economic and ecological assessment of the best use of water. 
For example, many NCW advocates in Spain are especially critical of water-intensive 
agricultural practices in semiarid regions. This social assessment begins with the guarantee 
of a minimum “human right” to consumption, which generally includes a tap inside of the 
house. Guarantees of socially-necessary consumption, however, do not trump the over- 
riding requirement to protect environmental values in the watershed. In summarizing its 
basic principles, the NCW defines, in order or priority, four fundamental functions of water 
in the environment:  
 1) Water for life – a basic lifeline of clean water as a human right for individual and 
collective well-being, that must not be denied by any society, and especially not by 
using the pretext of financial stringency;  
                                                                                                                                                     
environmental activism in Europe. One of the first policy shifts of the Rodríguez-Zapatero government that 
succeeded the Aznar administration (1999-2004) was to declare a moratorium on the implementation of the 
National Water Plan.  
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 2) Water for ecosystem sustainability;  
 3) Water for activities of general social interest, including but not limited to urban 
services, health, sanitation, and social cohesion, assuring their uniform availability 
to all groups in the society; and  
 4) Water for economic growth and development (Arrojo 2005ª).  
 
For the first three functions, the NCW erects an unconditional platform on which to build 
the foundation for equity and social cohesion, which must be promoted by the State, using 
“criteria of maximum socio-economic efficiency”. In this regard, it does not balk from 
advocating the application of appropriate models for water fees based on increasing block 
rates that are socially redistributive; instead of accepting the inevitability of present practice 
that is bureaucratic and inefficient to justify privatization, this paradigm calls for rising to 
the challenge of a “profound reform of public service,” based on the principles of 
“transparency, a healthy competitive environment of information and explicit comparisons 
with other operators (using benchmarking), and, in sum, participatory management” 
(Arrojo 2005ª).  
The NCW makes it clear that the last function, that of the productive uses of water, 
represents the greatest demand for water. As such, it is also the key to the heightening 
problems of scarcity, contamination, and overexploitation of rivers and aquifers. While it is 
essential to recognize that these uses are the legitimate right of individuals in their efforts to 
improve their standards of living, society has an obligation to ensure that this last use not 
become illegitimate or even illegal, exceeding the capacity of the ecosystems to replace 
these sources through natural processes and/or discharging effluents that are contaminating 
the environment; to avoid these problems, society must ensure the development of strict 
guidelines and the full application of the weight of the State in their application .  
The NCW provides a framework to assess the social appropriation of water in which 
urban water management agencies are important actors, even though they do not fill the 
entire stage. The NCW does not, however, adequately integrate the role of the public sector 
in regulation of water management and urban public service agencies in its analytical 
framework. Although its emphasis on demand management is fundamental, and its central 
concern with protecting watersheds is evident, this work does not consider how the public 
sector will ensure that each agency will contribute to its overall objectives. The NCW does 
not take a position on privatization, for example, except to insist that decisions on financing 
strategies should be made in a socially inclusive way. The market, without a doubt, opens 
up incentives for efficiency that can generate interesting improvements in the distribution 
and productive use of water, whether in the agricultural, industrial, or urban service sectors. 
Nevertheless, it is no less certain that market dynamics are blind and inefficient when it 
comes to the management of environmental issues, social issues, ethical issues, as well as 
those of inter-territorial equity. For those reasons, looking at the market as a “new magic 
wand” that guarantees a turn toward the New Culture of Water might be an error. 
Privatization and the regulation of water management –be it private or public, therefore, are 
issues requiring careful study and consideration (Arrojo 2005; Jiménez-Torrecilla and 
Martínez-Gil 2003).  
The NCW uses the term culture to signify the need for a paradigm shift. In this 
framework, water is not simply a factor of production, but has great value in the whole 
panoply of social, economic and recreational spaces, as integral parts of living cultural 
landscapes, and as a critical component of ecosystem infrastructure. It requires changes not 
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only in government and policy, but also in society as a whole (Jiménez-Torrecilla and 
Martínez-Gil 2003).  
B. Integrated Water Resource Management and the NCW  
Although the product of a process of intellectual development independent from the New 
Culture of Water, Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) can be thought of as 
an administrative parallel to the philosophical underpinnings of the NCW. There is broad 
agreement among experts in public administration that an IWRM approach is needed to 
integrate the needs of the multiplicity of users, the ecosystem requirements, and the 
imperatives of social and economic justice in an increasingly complex political 
environment of water management. Two fundamental principles for this reorganization are 
also broadly agreed upon: 1) the need for objectivity and impartiality in the administrative 
bodies, together with an adequate base of information and technical expertise, in the 
decision-making process; and 2) the overriding inclusion of the requirements of the 
ecosystems and, in particular, of the availability of water in evaluating the administrative 
decisions for the allocation of the resources.3  
Two additional elements are generally included in the institutional package for a 
minimally effective management system. The first, a strong and generally accepted system 
of property rights, is prerequisite for a sound institutional framework to permit the 
management scheme to function; the property rights system must be clear on the ownership 
and transferability of water use rights and ensure that the users themselves have an active 
role in resource (water) allocation and the operation of the necessary infrastructure. Finally, 
there is a broad consensus that a system of hydrological planning that privileges integrated 
management and efficient use of water resources must be implemented with broad 
participation and be guided by readily understood indicators that clearly identify the 
principal problems and bottlenecks between supply and demand of water for different uses. 
Such a system must effectively facilitate the coordination and management functions of the 
public sector with the productive and social needs of the consumers, generating incentives 
that maximize the long-term economic, social and environmental benefits that accrue from 
water use.  
 
C. Framework of Analysis  
The Mexican water management situation is different from Spain’s in many ways, 
including a greater reliance on groundwater, and the lack of a coordinated social movement 
promoting a New Culture of Water. However, the Spanish view suggests a framework of 
analysis that contextualizes and reinforces the importance of governance issues in urban 
water management systems, regardless of whether those systems are public or private. 
These are summarized in Table 1. To apply this framework to a study of urban water 
management agencies, we gathered information in the following seven categories:  
                                                 
3 The analysis offered in this and the next paragraphs has become standard in the specialized literature in 
recent years. Testimony to this is the fact that an international organization, the International Water Resource 
Management Institute, was created as part of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, 
to study these matters and the World Bank has created a “Water Resources Management Group” with its own 
sector strategy document (2004). One of the most cogent statements of the directions for change summarized 
in the text can be found in Ballestero, et al. (2005), where four case studies in Latin America are examined. 
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 a) Administrative and managerial functions  
 b) The effectiveness and efficacy of water delivery, including leakage and 
quality  
 c) The capacity of balancing demand and supply in distinct social sectors  
 d) The structure of fees, subsidies, spending, and investment  
 e) The implications of the system in terms of income distribution  
 f) Environmental impact in source areas, including the state of the aquifer  
 g) Sewage treatment and downstream impact  
 
Table 1: Framework for contextualizing the performance of urban water 
management agencies  
WATER 
SOURCES  
WATER 
WITHDRAWALS  
URBAN WATER 
MANAGEMENT 
AGENCIES  
SEWAGE 
TREATMENT  
AND DISPOSAL  
*Environmental 
impacts of water 
extraction  
*Social impacts of 
water extraction  
*Limited withdrawal 
possibilities  
*Consideration of 
alternative water 
sources, such as 
desalination, rain-
water harvesting, 
and wastewater 
recycling  
*Control and 
coordination of 
withdrawals  
*Other uses and 
users of water, 
especially 
agriculture  
*Technical and 
management 
efficiency  
*Demand 
management 
strategies  
*Social 
assessments of 
best use of water  
*Equity and social 
sufficiency in water 
delivery  
*Equity in tariff 
structures  
*Conservation 
incentives from 
tariff structure  
*Reconsideration of 
technological models 
of mixing grey-black 
and domestic-
industrial effluents  
*Environmental 
impact in discharge 
areas  
*Appropriate re-use 
of treated water  
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III. Water management: The state of the debate4  
During the 1990s, as Latin American counties frequently failed to provide growing urban 
populations with water and sanitation services, the World Bank, the IMF, the Inter-
American Development Bank, and other international financial institutions promoted 
various forms of privatization in the water sector; they were joined by the Global Water 
Partnership to convene three World Water Fora further intensifying the pressures for 
privatization of urban water management. The argument justifying this new approach rests 
on several propositions about water, the state, and the private sector. Historically, slightly 
different propositions about these actors justified a model of water provisioning in which 
public sector water provisioning agencies were perceived as the best solution to market 
failures. This section reviews those propositions, highlights the most important points in 
contention, and places the debate in the context of the New Culture of Water.  
A. The case for privatization  
First, advocates of privatization hold that water is a precious and limited good that is 
becoming increasingly scarce as populations – and demand – grow. Furthermore, the 
approach holds that the market provides the best way to allocate a scarce resource. If water 
consumers paid the full price of production – perhaps including environmental externalities 
– water would be more efficiently distributed and conserved. Taken together, this leads to 
the idea that it is best to sell water in order to save it.5
A second proposition blames the failure of the public sector to provide reliable 
water and sanitation services on its presumed inability to operate efficiently, to maintain 
infrastructure, and to generate the capital needed for infrastructure investment. Specific 
problems confronting public sector providers are said to include (Idelovitch and Ringskog 
1995):  
 1) Low physical efficiency due to lack of maintenance, technical and operational 
problems such that as much as forty or fifty percent of water is lost through leaking 
pipes, especially in irrigated agriculture.  
 2) Low financial efficiency, due to lack of metering, poor consumer records, and 
ineffective billing procedures. These create distortions in charging for water, fail to 
generate the data needed for planning, and create an inability to recover costs or 
make investments in improved service or reduced environmental and health impact.  
 3) Tariffs that fail to reflect the true economic cost of future water supplies.  
 4) Excess staff, often protected by public sector unions.  
 5) Political intervention, political appointments, inability to attract talented 
managers, and lack of qualified technical staff.  
The state supposedly lacks resources for infrastructure extensions. Mired in politics and the 
rent-seeking behavior of bureaucrats, it is unable to create the managerial innovations and 
                                                 
4 The ample literature on the heated debate about privatization is well summarized in the following 
references: Bakker, 2003; Balanyá, 2005; Barlow and Clarke, 2002; Hall, et al. 2001; World Bank, 2001. 
5 The preamble of the European Water Framework Directive, for example states that ‘water is not a 
commercial product like any other but, rather a heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as 
such.’ The document then obliges member states to achieve full cost pricing of water by 2010. For an 
evaluation of the Directive and a discussion of its development, see Kaika, 2003 and Page 2005. 
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technical capacity necessary to overcome the physical, financial, and personnel 
inefficiencies plaguing the water sector.6 6
The third proposition contrasts the inefficient state with an efficient private sector. 
Private sector actors are implicitly presented as apolitical agents isolated from political 
pressures. They are thought to be entrepreneurial and innovative, adopting the most 
appropriate technologies, best business practices, and leanest labor practices to increase 
efficiencies and recover costs. It is assumed that the private sector does not pursue rent-
seeking strategies through government manipulation; nor is the private sector thought to be 
vulnerable to pressures from politicians. In addition, the defense of private sector 
management strongly emphasizes the relatively facile access that the private sector has to 
capital markets, assuring its ready ability to generate capital for long-term, infrastructure 
investments in water service improvements.  
Thus, privatizers believe the state should substantially withdraw from public 
provision of water services. Instead, private sector actors should provide such services 
through a variety of mechanisms. These include service contracts, management contracts, 
lease arrangements, concessions, build-own-operate-transfer arrangements, joint ownership, 
mixed companies, and – rarely – outright sale. The state, meanwhile, should take on a 
regulatory and monitoring function, oversee the sector, provide guidance, and protect the 
rate payer from monopolistic behavior. Where a formal regulatory body is lacking, contract 
regulation becomes necessary.  
Whatever the specific form of privatization, increasing private sector participation in 
the water sector has the following objectives:  
 1) To increase the population supplied with water and sewerage  
 2) To expand sewage treatment to decrease health and environmental impacts  
 3) To provide better quality of service  
 4) To improve operating efficiency  
 5) To finance the system without public subsidies or guarantees  
B. Counter arguments  
A counter argument against the push toward privatization holds that water is not 
commercial and that commodification is essentially theft of a common good. Privatization 
organizes access to water on the basis of ability to pay. Some opponents of privatization 
insist that access to clean water for basic needs is a fundamental human right for which 
governments have the primary responsibility for ensuring that all people have equal access 
to water on a nonprofit basis. They reject the idea that water is best represented as a human 
need, which allows the private sector to provide the resource through the market on a for-
profit basis.  
As opponents of privatization argue, when water becomes a commodity sold to the 
highest bidder, water goes to those who can afford it, and this can only serve to deepen 
existing inequalities. Shutting off the water taps of the poor becomes acceptable and 
                                                 
6 A similar set of assumptions about the character of the state leads to recommendations for decentralization. 
This is thought to improve service delivery by empowering local governments, which are thought to be more 
accountable to local people, more responsive to their needs, more agile, and somewhat better able to enact 
innovations in management. Furthermore, decentralized water agencies might have a greater degree of 
autonomy from other local government responsibilities and be better able to facilitate the transfer of water 
management functions to private sector operators. 
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necessary – despite the human suffering and violent protest this generates. Thus, although 
efficiencies, in terms of leakage and cost recovery, might go up under privatization, 
affordability, access, and welfare of the poor might go down. In addition, privatization is 
often hypocritical in its implementation. Although domestic use comprises a small 
percentage of overall water consumption, privatization tends to fall most heavily on urban 
domestic users, with urban institutional and industrial interests less affected and agriculture 
often left out. In this case water allocations are frozen by history and the market allocates 
scarcity mainly among urban consumers, to the detriment of the poor.  
Furthermore, although the environmental concerns of excess water withdrawal and 
pollution are used to justify a full-cost pricing market approach, privatization does not 
resolve environmental problems. Reserving water for wetlands, estuaries, and future users 
is difficult to incorporate in pricing schemes, especially when governments withdraw from 
the sector and public accountability, participation, and oversight is diminished.  
Finally, critics say privatization puts power in the hands of distant and 
unaccountable institutions far removed from local communities and governments. They 
express a particular distrust of transnational and Northern-based corporations that do not 
have any particular allegiance to specific cities and regions in the global South. In contrast 
to promoters of privatization, critics are generally skeptical of the inherent efficiency of the 
private sector. Talk of public-private partnerships, for example, underestimates the kinds of 
strategies private firms adopt to maximize profits. Firms’ strategies can include political 
collusion, kick-backs, and abuses of the monopoly powers gained through poorly-written 
contracts and limited oversight by state regulators.  
Others have noted the continued need for the state to serve as regulator, arbiter and 
guarantor in a context of privatization. Privatization requires structures of transparency and 
accountability which, paradoxically, require strong and effective central state authorities 
(Tendler 1997). This approach suggests that the state’s failures in governance are not 
evaded through privatization, and thus alternatives that strengthen and reform the state 
require greater attention.  
C. Privatization in the New Culture of Water  
There are a number of parallels between the privatization debates and the New Culture of 
Water. For example, both approaches emphasize the goal of water conservation, the need to 
make decisions about how to allocate water, the importance of technical efficiency 
(reduction of leaks), and the possibility of conservation incentives (demand management) 
from well-designed tariff structures. On the other hand, the NCW is much more explicit 
about environmental issues and the livelihood impacts of water withdrawals and water 
pollution.  
Privatization is neither precluded nor promoted in the NCW framework. Instead, the 
NCW identifies the need to consider social, ecological, and economic assessment of the 
best use of water. It considers a human right to water, but interprets this as a minimum 
consumption under socially-acceptable conditions, within the limits of regional water 
availability. Ideally, public decisions about privatization should follow public debate about 
the social, ecological, and economic aspects of water allocation. Thus, it recognizes that the 
market potentially generates incentives for water conservation, but suggests that cross-
subsidies and equitable tariff schedules would have to consider a minimum human right to 
water consumption.  
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Furthermore, the NCW framework places the urban water management agencies, 
most frequently the arena of privatizations of various kinds, within a larger framework. 
This suggests that the privatization debate, which focuses mainly on service delivery issues 
while minimizing environmental and livelihood issues, provides a rather limited view of the 
goals for water management reform.  
 
IV. Water management in Mexico  
A. Mexico in a Latin American context  
Public provision of water services in Latin America are not of notably high quality. In the 
accompanying table (Table 2 – see appendix) we offer some very general figures on the 
prevailing situation in the region, using country data and the specific situation in the urban 
areas; the countries are organized in ascending order of their per capita incomes. It is very 
clear from a cursory examination of the information that the situation varies greatly among 
the countries and, as expected, there is a higher quality of service in the urban areas. 
Furthermore, as might be surmised, there is a significant statistical relationship between the 
level of national income and service coverage in the region: the Spearman’s rank 
correlation is .64 and .62 for potable water and sewage respectively at the national level 
(significant at the .01 confidence level; the data for the urban areas are not statistically 
significant).  
Countries throughout Latin America are experimenting with decentralized water 
management, and privatized systems are often the focus of surprisingly intense debate 
while failing to produce the expected service delivery improvements. Throughout the 
region, the public provision of these services by local government units is common; Chile 
is the outstanding exception to this pattern, with all water service privatized at the national 
level as part of the dramatic economic reforms that were promulgated during the 1980s.7 
Only a few countries have offered concessions to private sector companies, and most of 
these are quite recent, reflecting pressures from the international financial institutions, (e.g., 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development 
Bank, basically through conditionality clauses in their loans), for the transfer of public 
services to transnational corporations; Argentina and Bolivia have both been in the news 
because of public discontent with the practices of the foreign companies that were awarded 
the contracts. In October 2004, a national referendum in Uruguay modified the constitution 
to prohibit any privatization of water service.8 In contrast, private provision of water 
services in Colombia has proceeded without notable internal problems and international 
notoriety; this may be due in large measure to the effective system of regulation which 
assures effective participation of representatives of the companies, the government and the 
public in all hearings.  
                                                 
7 See Dourojeanni, 2000 and Bauer, 2004, for a review of the Chilean experience.  
8 On the Argentine experience, see Loftus and McDonald, 2001 and Eustache and Trujillo, 2003; on Uruguay, 
see Grosse, Thimmel and Taks, 2004: on Bolivia, see Olivera, 2005 and Warner and Moreyra, 2004; on the 
general subject see the excellent article by Bakker, 2003, the book by von Weizsäcker, et al., 2005, and the 
case studies in Balanyá, et al. 2005. 
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As should be expected for one of the countries with a high per capita income, 
Mexico is among the better serviced countries. (Table 2– see appendix) Although the 
census data are not comparable with the regional sources, they show the considerable 
improvement in coverage of water and sewage services during the past half century (Table 
3 – see appendix); while urban Mexico has grown rapidly, water services provision has 
increased even faster, assuring increasing levels of coverage. Although the information by 
cities in Mexico, published by the National Water Commission (CNA for its initials in 
Spanish), shows relatively high levels of coverage, it also documents dramatic variations in 
water supply as well as large differences in the operating efficiency (both physical and 
commercial) of the water agencies in a sample of cities for which data are available. (Table 
4 – see appendix); in this table, we have ordered the cities by the available per capita water 
supplies. Just as striking is the information on operating costs, which indicate a range from 
about one peso per cubic meter to more than seven pesos reflecting not only local 
efficiencies but also the striking differences related to water availability, water quality and 
the topographical and other physical factors that influence agency costs; similarly, there are 
striking differences among cities in the number of workers per thousand water contracts, 
ranging from about 3.3 to almost 11 in one instance. Not surprisingly, we found no 
statistical test that would enable us to describe agency performance in a more systematic 
way; most troubling is the qualitative observation that those agencies with the largest staffs, 
in relative terms, are not the most efficient in either delivering water to their customers or 
in assuring a less wasteful process of distribution and treatment.9
Today, there is a general crisis facing Latin American societies with regard to the 
administration of their water resources. Throughout the region, one country after another is 
following the example of Chile, which profoundly reorganized its water sector in 1981. As 
mentioned above, Mexico has been moving along the same path since creating the CNA in 
1989 and enacting the Ley de Aguas Nacionales in 1992, which was then amended in 2004. 
Mexico’s reform process has been profoundly influenced by the Integrated Water Resource 
Management approach, with a strong central agency ostensibly (but ineffectively) 
coordinating the sector.  
B. The institutional history of urban water services in Mexico  
Mexico’s National Water Commission, the CNA, was created in 1989, as a specialized 
agency to centralize all matters regarding water management. The broad mandate charges it 
not only with dealing with issues of managing the nation’s water resources but also for 
maintaining adequate records of available supplies and the quality of water; it is primarily 
responsible for administering the allocation of water to all users, public and private, and 
assuring correct functioning of the local agencies directly charged with the management of 
water services to consumers and the regional councils charged with the management of the 
water basins and irrigation districts. Under the Mexican constitution as amended (Article 
27), virtually all water is property of the nation and the federal authorities are charged with 
                                                 
9 Unfortunately, most of the published material on urban water management in Mexico is widely dispersed in 
journals related to natural resource management and public administration. There have been an increasing 
number of theses and dissertations on the subject in recent years, but most of these are not readily available, 
as there is no central service that makes them available as is the case for other countries. Some of these 
publications examine conditions in the cities where we undertook case studies and will be cited in those 
instances; those of a more general nature will be mentioned in the analytical sections, as is appropriate. 
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distributing it among claimants; this gives the Commission broad authority to manage all 
sources, including surface supplies and underground aquifers. It coordinates activities with 
other federal agencies responsible water use, like the Federal Electricity Commission that 
operates hydroelectric facilities and the Ministry of Agriculture that develops plans for rural 
production.10
In the area of urban water management, the CNA's principal responsibility is to 
assure the delivery of adequate supplies of water for the population and for productive 
activities. This includes not only the planning, construction, and operation of infrastructure 
for the extraction, transport and delivery of water, but also the negotiation of considerable 
inter-basin transfers in a number of cases where local supplies are inadequate for 
burgeoning urban populations and rapidly growing productive sectors. Ironically, this 
system of centralized control of management of water resources is supposed to facilitate the 
smooth operation of a highly decentralized structure in which almost 2,500 local water 
agencies operate at the county level; responsibility for local level administration of water 
services is relatively new, dating to modifications in the Constitution in 1983. We will 
return to this issue of intergovernmental relations in later sections of the paper and in the 
concluding analysis.  
This analysis of the urban water management system in Mexico started from the 
widely accepted premise that the system is very badly managed and presents enormous 
problems because of lack of accurate information, uncertainty about the conditions of the 
aquifers from which water is drawn, absence of technical and administrative skills to define 
and implement basic management functions, and, most seriously, an inaccurate definition 
of the proper scope of action of the water sector in Mexico. The country’s present problems 
with urban water management have a long history that merits some mention, since it 
strongly influences the current structure of service and the serious problems that have yet to 
be adequately faced. Until 1983, central government ministries were responsible for all 
water allocation and distribution; these services were variously administered by district 
offices of these organizations; many irrigated farms and large industrial users were issued 
permits to drill and operate their own wells or directly draw water from surface sources.  
With the 1983 constitutional reform, responsibility for drinking water and sewage 
was transferred to the states and municipalities. Although firmly grounded in the conviction 
that the system had to be decentralized, political and financial exigencies did not permit this 
ambitious change to be accompanied by the transfer of financial resources or technical 
capacities to ensure that the services could be administered well. On the contrary, 
contemporaneous reforms in the tax system reduced the financial autonomy of local and 
state governments, while the technical cadre that had operated the system until that point 
did not support the transfer of functions to these new operators and continued to guide 
decisions in directions that assured effective control by the central government 
organizations and, in some cases, in coordination with state government offices. Thus, 
although generally recognized as a good idea, effective decentralization was systematically 
                                                 
10 Although this is not the place to go into details about Mexico’s irrigation infrastructure, it is worthy of 
mention that the country is one of the temperate countries with the highest proportion of irrigated to total 
arable land in the world, at almost 25%; there are about 6 million hectares of land capable of being irrigated 
of a total of about 25 million hectares under cultivation. Considerable portions of this infrastructure are not 
well maintained and others are not used for a large variety of institutional reasons; in fact, many of these 
obstacles are the result of conflicts among federal agencies or between jurisdictions that are unable to resolve 
their differences. 
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thwarted by bureaucratic and political groups fearful for the loss of influence in the 
evolving governmental structure and by individuals concerned about their personal fortunes 
in the face of important changes in the geographic and political balance of power (Castro 
1995).  
The unwieldiness and ineffectiveness of the water management system remained on 
the political agenda with the election of a new president and change in administrations in 
1988. The CNA emerged as a national regulatory body, with a mission to promote 
decentralization by offering water agencies a greater degree of autonomy from other local 
government responsibilities and promoting the transfer of as many functions as possible or 
even whole systems, to private sector operators, thereby contributing to reduce the 
overwhelming financial pressures facing the sector. A key element of this new structure 
involved a commitment to reduce the financial dependency of the water sector on the 
government budget by charging for water services, setting fees sufficiently high to cover 
the real costs of operating the systems so as to confer the local organizations with an 
increasing measure of autonomy. To implement this mandate, structural reforms endowed 
some of the new local water agencies with greater legitimacy, creating their own boards of 
directors and administrative councils with power to set tariffs and approve investment 
programs, as well as independent authority to negotiate contracts with third parties (private 
enterprise); one important change, which has yet to be widely accepted, is the power to cut 
off or at least restrict service to customers who are not current in their payments.11 These 
new directions in the domestic policy formulation can be directly traced to a concerted 
effort by the international financial institutions (IFI’s),12 but most especially the World 
Bank and the Inter American Development Bank, to implement new policy framework for 
public service provision in developing countries, more consistent with the neoliberal 
“Washington Consensus” that was dominant at the time.13
By the end of the XX century, the reform program for the water sector was still far 
from being implemented. Independently of the CNA's ability to actually advance on the 
many dimensions for institutional reform and modernization, it seems clear that there are 
two different types of obstacles facing the water sector. On the state and local levels, both 
state coordinating and technical assistance organizations and operating agencies lack the 
financial resources, technical capacity and the political mandate to undertake the thorough-
going structural reforms required to improve service. On the federal level, there is a 
profound political debate –that has not been permitted to surface as an open discussion in 
the national arena– about the structure of political control and operating responsibilities for 
water services in Mexico. There are serious disagreements about the exercise of individual 
and collective rights to water, including a history of illegal, de facto, expropriations of 
                                                 
11 These reforms were all contingent on political concessions by local politicians who had to renounce control 
over appointments and budgetary allocations as well as on enabling legislation by state legislatures, many of 
which were reluctant to cede their authority for fixing tariffs and staffing. 
12 These include the International Monetary Fund, which does not generally offer financial aid for specific 
projects, the World Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and other regional banks, of which the 
Asian Development Bank has been particularly active in the area of water services. The North American 
Development Bank, together with its sister organization, the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission, 
has also financed numerous drinking water systems, along with drainage lines and sewage treatment plants. 
13 Consult, for example, the description of the Washington Consensus by one of its creators (Williamson, 
1999), or a more critical view by one of its most authoritative critics (Stiglitz, 2002). For a critical analysis of 
the privatization of water services, see Balanyá, et al. (2005), Barlow and Clarke (2002), and the authoritative 
website on the subject: www.psiru.org/reportsindex.asp  
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access to water from indigenous and other community groups; these problems are 
exacerbated by a long history of official concessions, transfer of permits for wells and 
surface water rights among individuals, and illegal appropriation of water by different 
groups. A second matter affecting the national water context is the controversy about the 
ability of the public sector to assure the adequate provision of drinking water and sewage 
treatment facilities, given the penury of public financing and the lack of expertise; while the 
IFI’s have weighed in quite strongly in this regard, in both Mexico and elsewhere, to push 
for the privatization of public services in general, and water, in particular, in Mexico, the 
CNA has been a strong advocate of this position from its very beginnings (CNA 2003; 
IADB 2003; Roemer 1997; Warner and Moreyra 2004).  
In addition to these institutional obstacles, there are philosophical disagreements 
about the operational mandates that have become sources of conflicts in the implementation 
of the modernization and decentralization agenda. Most academic observers of the process 
are in agreement that, in spite of legislative mandates and frequent declarations of 
commitments to stakeholder participation, the CNA’s approach does not offer any effective 
opportunities for local level participation in decision-making. Just as serious, the 
Commission’s engineering approach does not include a serious evaluation of the 
environmental impacts of its decisions or provide criteria to deny or challenge petitions for 
concessions for water rights that often exceed water availability in each water basin.14  
 
C. Sectoral and fragmented, despite centralization  
Mexico’s reform process has been profoundly influenced by the IWRM approach. In spite 
of the far-reaching institutional reforms, however, the country, like most others in the 
region, is still plagued by a water resource management system that is characterized by a 
fundamentally sectoral approach; that is, each of the different categories of users –
agriculture, hydroelectricity and urban-industrial– is guided by its own set of guidelines and 
overseen by separate agencies whose criteria for fixing operational standards and allocating 
water among competing claimants differ. This system has generated numerous local crises 
and there is a growing consensus that it is assuming national proportions, as regions and 
users encroach on each other, taking water from each other and delivering discharges that 
are violating historical pacts while compromising environmental integrity, human health, 
and social peace. The resulting mix of growing scarcity and spreading of negative 
externalities, along with increasingly predatory and unethical competition among users, is 
producing intensifying conflicts and inefficient uses of the resource as well as worrisome 
degrees of environmental degradation.  
The institutional reforms enacted in Chile, and subsequently in Brazil and Mexico, 
were conceived to try to overcome the obstacles imposed by obsolete administrative 
structures. The idea of creating a single regulatory agency would be able to overcome the 
partial visions that local and sectoral agencies bring to their planning processes; it was 
paramount in the thinking of those trying to implement this modern approach to resource 
                                                 
14 There are a number of serious evaluations of citizen participation in the various processes involved in 
national, regional and local water planning. Starting from different vantage points, and using different criteria, 
they generally agree that the CNA does not consider participation to be a relevant consideration in program 
design and implementation (Wester, 2003; Castro et al., 2004; Vera Cartas, 2005). Similarly, although 
considerations with regard to environmental protection and ecosystem conservation are an important part of 
the discourse, they are not part of the operational thinking of the people charged with policy design and 
implementation (Castro et al., 2004). 
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management; if it was to work, it would require a strong central agency endowed with 
autonomy and cutting edge technical capabilities that could be made operational. Even 
more difficult, however, is the requirement to construct social consensus among the 
stakeholders –users committed to accepting mediation procedures that are virtually 
unknown in Mexican political arenas; this requires developing open processes of 
participation and dialogue, an element of institutional change that was not explicitly 
considered in the institutional reform process.  
Urban water management in Mexico, in particular, is being subjected to pressures 
from all sectors of society. From a budgetary and administrative vantage point, the system 
is in crisis, with growing subsidies required to provide inadequate service that 
systematically discriminates against the poor and rural sectors of society. From a public 
health perspective, water quality is creating epidemiological problems, because the quality 
of water delivered to the population is either unsuitable for safe consumption or because the 
agencies are unable to convince their clients that its quality is acceptable; as a result, in 
spite of low personal income levels, Mexico is now the second only to Italy in its 
consumption of privately supplied bottled water in the world. Its urban infrastructure is 
antiquated and insufficient; many public works departments and water service agencies do 
not have a reasonable idea of the way in which their systems have been constructed and 
lack the basic analytical tools and machinery to begin to correct the situation. In many parts 
of the country, they are simply incapable of dealing with the strong seasonal variations in 
water flows, resulting from storms and drought, with repetitive cycles of destruction 
affecting primarily the poorest segments in society during periods that are euphemistically 
labeled ‘natural’ disasters. From an environmental point of view, most of the aquifers 
supplying urban areas are overexploited, leading to dangerous levels of depletion and the 
growing concentration of noxious minerals and agroindustrial and industrial residues that 
pose innumerable public health and ecological problems; uncontrolled and untreated 
effluent discharges are further exacerbating the problems, poisoning people and ecosystems 
and occasioning further problems as the waters are reused in agricultural and industrial 
production or, even worse, for consumption by Mexico’s poorest social groups. It is no 
wonder that Mexico’s leading specialists foresee the possibility of a greater intensity of 
social outbreaks in the coming years because of this situation.15  
D. A diagnosis of urban water management in Mexico  
There is general agreement in Mexico that the water management system is in crisis. Since 
its creation, the CNA has repeatedly maintained that one its principal foci of has been to 
promote the improvement of service standards by developing a regulatory structure and by 
improving the quality of the operating agencies. As part of this process, it continues to 
collaborate closely with the International Financial Institutions (IFI’s) which have been 
allocating increasing amounts of financial assistance to upgrade the agencies and to build 
infrastructure. A complex set of institutional mechanisms have been developed to finance 
new infrastructure and upgrade existing water systems, some of which provide additional 
                                                 
15 Perhaps the recent appearance of a book describing the depth of the water management crisis in the central 
part of Mexico – including the Mexico City and Toluca valleys – is symptomatic of the way in which present-
day conflicts have been carefully cultivated over past years as politicians successfully postponed the “day of 
reckoning” by drawing water from other watersheds to satisfy burgeoning urban-industrial demands without 
regard to the social and environmental consequences (Perló y González, 2005). 
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incentives for creating opportunities for private concessions. In addition to these loans from 
the IFI’s, there have been a considerable number of technical assistance missions and 
outside consultants conducting evaluations and providing recommendations to the CNA 
and to state and local water agencies; an overriding characteristic of these visits has been 
their focus on providing the information and the preparatory organizational support that 
would facilitate the contracting out of various aspects of the management system to private 
firms. This study provides an overview of the present state of urban water service 
management in Mexico.  
The bureaucracy charged with the management of the water sector is acutely aware 
of its deficiencies. Internal documents and professional evaluations by private consultants 
and the IFI's offer a continuing flow of studies providing supporting information that 
highlight these problems and recommend costly solutions. However, even a cursory review 
of the current state of affairs points to the historical tension between the idea that 
decentralization improves the efficiency of water provisioning and the idea that issues of 
equity, transparency, and participation hinder water management strategies. The technical 
staff and managers presently charged with operations often shrug off this tension as a 
product of the intrusion of political forces beyond their control that can only be confronted 
by further removing the daily operations from the view of the public. In order to deal with 
these issues, their preferred solution, as well as that of their advisors and financiers, is to 
either strengthen the autonomy of each operating agency or to pursue a radical strategy of 
privatization of individual segments of the operation or transferring the service by means of 
a concession to an outside operator. In this view, then, the state water commissions would 
be responsible for regulatory oversight and direct political negotiations with their 
legislatures and user groups, leaving the tasks of forging an efficient operating organization 
to a technocracy that can remain aloof from the political machinations that are the source of 
so much conflict and inefficiency.  
Of the almost 2,500 Mexican water agencies charged with delivering services to 
(mostly urban) populations, more than 80% are small departments within municipal 
government agencies; they lack professional staff and are handicapped by a political system 
that does not allow local-level officials, who are chosen for a three-year term of office, to 
run for reelection; it is the exceptional unit where the technical and administrative 
personnel have the minimum training required to provide adequate service. Since its 
creation, the CNA has been particularly focused on transforming these agencies into more 
independent bodies, with professional staff and legal structures that would permit a greater 
measure of continuity and independence. As a result, there are now about 435 water 
agencies that have become semi-autonomous organizations, with differing degrees of 
administrative, financial, and political independence, to manage their tasks; although better 
prepared than most, many are still woefully unprepared for the challenges of adequately 
running their organizations and meeting the demands for bringing local service standards 
up to national objectives. There is a wide variety of managerial schemes presently being 
used as models for the organization and reorganization of public service providers in 
Mexico. This move towards professionalism and decentralization has preempted an 
ongoing concern about the coverage and quality of water and sewage services; the CNA 
belittles this problem, and local agencies attempt to deal with the situation in an ad hoc 
manner but it continues to resurface, generally in the form of social protest or outright 
confrontation between the local operators and the social groups in poorer neighborhoods or 
on the marginal fringes of the urban areas.  
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In selecting our case studies, and in diagnosing performance, we identified seven 
key components for analysis. We are particularly concerned to determine whether one 
organizational form or another –public or private ownership, centralized or decentralized 
management– has proved to be more effective in providing adequate service levels, 
measured with both quantitative and qualitative indicators. As mentioned earlier, the seven 
basic factors that are examined in the next part of this document, both on a national level 
and with the use of materials drawn from detailed case studies, include:  
 a) Administrative and managerial functions  
 b) The effectiveness and efficacy of water delivery, including leakage and 
quality  
 c) The capacity of balancing demand and supply in distinct social sectors  
 d) The structure of fees, subsidies, spending, and investment  
 e) The implications of the system in terms of income distribution  
 f) Environmental impact in source areas, including the state of the aquifer  
 g) Sewage treatment and downstream impact  
In summary, the study is designed to identify the ability of different organizational 
structures to manage urban water systems, assuring broad and quality service. It 
encompasses both measures of financial viability, within the tariff structures fixed by state 
and local governments to which they report, as well as the responsible management of the 
ecosystems from which they draw their water and to which they discharge the effluent 
streams. Information was drawn from the National Water Commission (CNA) and from 
individual studies conducted by water agencies and independent researchers.  
V. Research method  
The new culture of water perspective suggests that the scope of responsibility of water 
management must confront issues of demand management and source area protection in 
order to construct socially just –and socially acceptable– water management strategies. The 
analytical framework synthesizes these views; it holds that the effectiveness of water 
provisioning services is a function of the institutional context and the scope of 
responsibility of the managing authority. To evaluate Mexican urban water systems, we 
subjected the principal institutional and operating characteristics to an analysis guided by 
the NCW perspective. Thus, we framed our research in terms of the impacts of these 
systems on society, production and the environment.  
The study involved the integration of materials from a wide variety of sources. The 
documentary materials were drawn from official sources, newspaper accounts, and 
academic analyses, including extensive field visits. Local interviews were conducted in 
water agencies, with officials from the state regulatory agencies, and the CNA, in addition 
to numerous people directly involved in the reorganization of the sector during the past 
decade. We selected six cities in which to conduct more detailed cased studies on the basis 
of criteria that would facilitate some understanding of the impact of the varying 
institutional forms on the levels and quality of water service delivered to the population; the 
cities are: Aguascalientes, Cancún, León, Puebla, Saltillo, and San Luis Potosí. We were 
particularly interested in learning about the possibility and levels of public participation in 
influencing local standards, and the differential responsiveness of private and public 
management systems to social demands.  
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Information barriers: Our original intention was to produce an essay summarizing the 
water management situation in each city, an objective that proved unachievable because of 
the poverty of the available data and the secrecy with which the agencies jealousy guard as 
much information as possible about their operations; this problem is so serious that their 
regular reports to the CNA on operational results and in-house evaluations are frequently 
unbelievable; in many cases, the discrepancies arise because the figures are estimates rather 
than being based on actual reports of physical or financial variables. In other cases, the 
agencies simply do not have the equipment or personnel to measure such basic information 
as real energy usage, water extractions or even the extent and condition of their 
infrastructure. The inability to produce coherent institutional histories or evaluations is also 
the result of the rapid turnover of personnel; even in the cases of those decentralized and 
‘autonomous’ agencies that are not subject to the 3-year political cycles of local 
government, the plethora of technical, administrative and political problems resulting from 
attempts by dedicated civil servants to reorganize their structure and rationalize procedures 
frequently provokes such strong reactions that the well-intentioned reformers are rapidly 
replaced. Only when these innovators are backed by strong political leadership and an 
effective professional staff can they implement an institutional and administrative package 
that allows them to modernize the water service and attack some of the inherited problems 
of inadequate infrastructure, system design, and managerial inadequacies; although the 
CNA argues (2003) that these problems cannot be readily overcome without privatization 
of specific services or the whole system, there are notable examples of public agencies that 
have managed to implement effectively a wholesale modernization program: León, 
Monterrey and Tijuana are among the largest systems generally cited in this respect; 
although these agencies undoubtedly have the best information systems in Mexico, they 
have not been notably forthcoming with the detailed information that would be necessary to 
evaluate their performance in a detailed manner: their responses to requests for information 
in this study and from others has been to refer people to relatively unstructured and 
uninformative web pages.  
The study did not analyze the costs of operating urban water systems, since 
responsibilities are widely dispersed among government agencies at all levels of 
government, without any systematic coordination. Although probably not by design, the 
present division of labor and lack of effective oversight has resulted in a structure in which 
the real costs of service cannot be readily determined. Further complicating the difficulty of 
estimating the true costs of water service, are the lack of consistent accounting procedures 
and standards, making any evaluation of the true cost of service virtually impossible. 
Among the more serious problems is the frequent use of water agencies as employment 
repositories for political appointees and for people being occupied as a result of political or 
union pressures; in some cases, the inclusion of non-service related functions in water 
agencies is a result of historical agreements that later administrations have found 
impossible to dislodge, such as the inclusion of a professional football team on the payroll 
in the case of Morelia.  
In the following section, we integrate the results of our field studies with studies 
conducted by other analysts and by the agencies themselves to characterize the 
management of urban water services in Mexico. In each of the sections, we summarize 
findings, guided by the seven principal areas of concern suggested by the New Culture of 
Water perspective.  
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VI. A summarized analysis of urban water management 
services in Mexico  
A. The administration and management of urban water services.  
Urban water services in Mexico are delivered through a wide variety of administrative 
structure in different parts of the country. Although the most common organizational form 
is the provision of water services through a municipal department, most people in Mexico 
are served by semi-autonomous (public sector) organizations that have been granted some 
degree of independence by recent changes in state and municipal legislation; this 
institutional change was promoted and has been supported financially by the CNA since it 
was created (CNA 1989). This move towards decentralization contributed to giving the 
agencies a greater measure of stability and financial self-sufficiency as well as a firmer 
basis for obtaining financing for new investments, making their revenue streams directly 
available to guarantee repayment.  
Serious efforts have been made at all levels of government to improve the 
administration of urban water services in Mexico. There has been an unending program of 
training courses, diagnostic evaluations, national seminars and technical assistance 
programs to implement a broad series of reforms designed to help the local agencies meet 
the challenge of providing increasing coverage and better quality water, while pushing for 
the improvement of financial indicators on the commercial side of the operation. National 
resources were constantly enriched with financial and technical assistance from the World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, organizations that were not only 
supporting modernization, but also private sector participation in contracts and operating 
concessions.  
Perhaps the two most important programs to improve the delivery of water to users 
have been the elaboration of reliable lists of users and the installation of meters to measure 
usage and develop mechanisms to begin to control consumption. It is generally agreed that 
until the authorities have a better idea of where the water is being used and establishing 
tariffs that penalize large consumers for their excesses, they have little possibility of 
introducing mechanisms to rein in water usage; but such a process requires a previous step 
of macro-measurement that allows the water agencies to determine how much water they 
receive and process, a step that remarkably has not been implemented in more than 80 
percent of the systems.  
As might be expected, in the systems that we examined with care, four of the six 
agencies know with relative precision the volume of water they extract from their regular 
sources of supply. Developing complete registers of their users, however, has proved to be 
especially difficult, in part for an institutional obstacle that is particularly evident in the 
case of Cancún, because of its burgeoning urban growth: the company is prevented from 
invoicing water used in the large numbers of marginal communities on the periphery which 
occupy lands to which they do not have proper titles since the invoices themselves might 
constitute evidence of land ownership.16,17 In San Luis Potosí, the company faces problems 
                                                 
16 AguaKan, the Cancun water company managed by the Suez subsidiary Ondeo, distributes water to the 
marginal settlements under contract with the state water agency, although this water is distributed free of 
charge. 
17 In several urban areas, this problem is posed by wealthy suburban developments that resist “regularizing” 
their connections to municipal services, availing themselves of their political and/or economic influence and 
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of defining total water consumption because the significant farming communities in its 
water district have presidential grants to use raw sewage for irrigation in addition to the 
underground water that they extract. In Puebla, administrative chaos is so serious that even 
the all-important hotel industry, on which the city depends for an important proportion of 
its economic activity, cannot obtain adequate water supplies through the public system, and 
therefore must resort to regular deliveries by tank trucks to assure their ability to operate; in 
this case, the anarchy led to its foreign partner, Veolia, resigning its contract in 2005 
because of the system’s inability to correct its long-standing structural problems.18
With the letting of concessions, the new companies usually make rapid strides in 
completing their customer rolls and improving collection procedures. This was the case in 
the first significant private concession made since the creation of the CNA: Aguascalientes 
(Caldera, 2004), as well as in the subsequent private sector contract in Saltillo.19 In both 
cases there were significant advances in service coverage and consistency in availability of 
water. By extending and repairing water lines and improving pumping equipment, 
controlling water pressures in the system and installing procedures for identifying leaks, the 
companies made substantial strides in improving the quality and quantity of water they 
deliver to customers. Similarly, in the case of the publicly managed company in León, a 
business oriented administration of the publicly owned company installed in the early 
1990s has demonstrated that such advances are not necessarily limited to privately managed 
firms. In these four cases, as well as several others throughout the country, the agencies are 
finding it relatively easy to increase the proportion of households serviced effectively by 
extending their networks, by enforcing regulations for developers to create adequate 
networks within their subdivisions and by introducing relatively simple measures like 
dividing their networks into sectors and closely monitoring water pressure within these 
segments.  
On a more mundane level, it seems surprising, given the emphasis on increasing 
efficiency, that the more routine aspects of the administrative structures of water service 
departments throughout the country have not been able to meet the challenge of effective 
accounting and managerial systems. Repeatedly in our interviews with service providers as 
well as with purveyors of software and services, it became evident that the inability to keep 
track of various essential parts of the operations continues to be a major obstacle to 
overcoming the inherited inertia of poor collection and payment mechanisms and an 
inability to generate analytical information to inform top management properly of 
performance indicators. Even more troublesome than the smaller systems that still maintain 
records manually, are the several large metropolitan areas that have introduced modern 
software systems that they are not able to properly maintain and update or modify with 
                                                                                                                                                    
the relative weakness of municipal governments, as is the case of Patzcuaro, a colonial tourist attraction that is 
home to groups historically accustomed to dominating a highly stratified local society. 
18 Veolia had a management contract that in essence placed it at the center of responsibility for overall 
management of the system; it withdrew because of its inability to avoid excessive interference from local 
politicians who contravened basic management agreements. 
19 The private sector contracts in Mexico City were conceived precisely for improving the customer rolls and 
raising collections, rather than for operating the system as a whole. In spite of substantial investments in 
upgrading the administrative systems, as a whole, the system is only able to collect about one-half of the 
water bills in a current fashion, and three-quarters of annual billing in a relatively current manner. 
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their own personnel; as a result, the software vendors have a great deal of influence over 
operations and often control the nature of the modifications that can be introduced.20
One of the most important aspects of a public service agency is ensuring its 
responsiveness to public needs and demands. Here too, local systems are generally 
unprepared to face the challenges presented by the modernizing discourse from the highest 
levels of the political hierarchy: the promise of accountability and transparency. The 
agencies are unable to provide the national authorities (CNA) with the basic information 
about operating parameters, and in those cases where they have ‘independent’ boards of 
directors, we found that the information provided to these people was inadequate or even 
misleading, making it virtually impossible for them to provide effective oversight: in the 
case of evaluation of the new private administration in Saltillo requested by the Board of 
Directors and conducted by the highly regarded private water consultants from the region’s 
private university, the problem became particularly absurd when the evaluating group 
produced a very expensive but totally inadequate report; even after the Board and the 
municipal partner requested considerable revision, the directors found themselves unable to 
either abrogate the contract for non-fulfillment or demand compliance with the original 
terms.21 In place of effective managing directors or avenues for public participation, a 
number of the better managed companies and their respective municipal governments are 
contracting with public opinion and survey research firms to measure public reactions to 
the changing institutional structures for water management; not surprisingly, these 
assessments turn out generally positive, as the new companies find it relatively easy to 
increase coverage and improve the quality of service, given the dismal record of service 
provided by the previous managers.  
B. Efficiency and Efficacy in water service delivery.  
Examining the efficiency and efficacy of water services involves a multidimensional 
evaluation of the process of water service delivery. Efficiency can be examined in terms of 
physical volumes of water delivered and treated as well as in economic terms. Efficacy is 
evaluated it terms of the ability of the system to respond to local and international standards 
in water service delivery.  
 
Efficiency. On the whole, Mexico faces many difficulties in raising its record of physical 
efficiency in urban water service delivery. There is inadequate knowledge of innovative 
technological alternatives and insufficient funds for redesigning and replacing obsolete 
infrastructure networks and information is simply not available to even identify precisely 
where the problems are. There is a generalized perception that the quality of water 
delivered to consumers varies greatly, even within a single metropolitan area, with 
systematic biases against poor, when considering the volumes and quality of water 
delivered to the communities. Even more serious is the record of treating sewage effluents, 
since there are relatively few treatment plants, a large proportion of which are inoperative 
                                                 
20 Not surprisingly, some of the larger municipal systems are using software designed and sold by the large 
international water companies, but without the capability to enter modify the ‘source code’ to adapt the 
programs to the specific needs of the city. In these cases, they depend on the good will and/or service 
contracts with the vendors to maintain their administrative processes, often without adequate training, 
especially for top management. 
21 In an interview, the municipal controller reported that local government dare not strongly challenge the 
manager, appointed by its private counterpart, lest problems between the partners become too tense. 
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for technical and financial reasons or, more troublesome still, the lack of human resources 
to assure their correct operation.  
There are a number of different sources of inefficiency in the delivery systems. 
Perhaps the most serious is the lack of widespread use of metering for bulk water 
extractions from aquifers or for volumes processed by the local water companies. 
Household or commercial deliveries also go unmeasured in a surprising number of regions, 
and even where (micro) meters have been installed, many are inoperative or not 
systematically read. As a result, the service providers simply do not know very much about 
water flows through their systems and are unable to keep track of the quality of the water 
they are supplying to their customers; outside the major metropolitan areas managed by 
decentralized agencies there are very few systems that even aspire to provide water of a 
bacteriological or mineral content in accord with international or even domestic standards. 
Another result of the absence of information and the social pressures on local decision 
makers to compensate for leakage and complaints of non-delivery is the installation of 
larger pumping systems that cannot correct the problems but significantly increase the costs 
of operation and end up actually increasing leakage because of the higher pressures.  
Even more serious than the lack of information about water flows, is the dreadful 
state of design and repair of the water mains. In one city after another, we found a serious 
intermixing of materials used in the construction of the mains and reports of important 
volumes of uncontrolled leakages throughout the system. Most systems have not 
implemented technologies and networks to subdivide their areas into sectors so as to enable 
them to detect and control water flows as well as to assure and maintain pressurized 
systems.  
To illustrate the practical consequences of these generalizations, a few references to 
the national data on water service will suffice. There were 526 water treatment plants in 
Mexico in 2003 (the last year for which data are published – CNA 2004), of which more 
than 10% of the plants were inoperative and only 35% of the installed capacity was 
reported to be in use. There were 1320 municipal sewage treatment plants of which 13% 
were out of service, with only about 67% of the installed capacity in service. When 
evaluating municipal service as a whole, we find that the volume of water estimated to be 
supplied by municipal water agencies –some 320,000 liters/second– less than one-fifth of 
the volume was even flowing through the plants, many of which do not operate adequately. 
These data cannot even begin to measure the proportions of water lost in the several stages 
between the points of extraction and delivery.  
This information can only hint at the magnitude of the financial burden that this 
pattern of inefficiency represents. Throughout the country, Mexico’s topography requires 
tremendous expenditures for moving water both horizontally and vertically, extracting it 
from greater depths from the nation’s increasingly over-exploited aquifers and from ever 
increasing distances, as competition grows among users and conflicts intensify among uses. 
Since these costs are paid in large measure by local governments, where the tax systems are 
especially regressive, the inefficiencies suggested in this text impose a particularly 
disproportionate fiscal burden on the poorest social groups in Mexico.  
 
Efficacy. Exacerbating the impacts of this pattern of inefficiency is the unequal way in 
which water services are delivered to the population. As is common in many other parts of 
the world, the infrastructure for urban water services are primarily oriented to serve the 
needs of established populations in and around the central core of urban areas. As cities 
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expand, new infrastructure to assure adequate delivery depends on the local resources that 
are allocated on the basis of highly contested political struggles for competing budgetary 
demands; historically, this process of urban water services expansion has systematically 
discriminated against the poorer communities, especially those “irregular” settlements on 
the urban fringes. As a result, there is a very unequal distribution of regular water service 
among social groups in urban areas.  
A superficial review of the Mexican data on water provisioning suggests that this 
harsh judgment is unwarranted. In 2003, almost 90 percent (89.4%) of the urban population 
was reported to be connected to regular potable water service and 77.2 % were linked to 
sewage lines. Unfortunately, this optimistic picture is belied by a series of more detailed 
analyses of the characteristics of water service in different sectors within each urban area 
and among those areas. We discovered, for example, that the local water companies 
generally are not allowed to provide water connections to those housing units and 
neighborhoods (colonias) in which there were “irregular” settlements without formal titles 
to their lands; since a water invoice might be considered valid evidence of land ownership 
in some legal proceedings, the local water agencies have to be careful in assuring that their 
bills are issued in the name of the title holders. Students of urban settlements in Mexico 
estimate that this segment of the population represents as much as 35% of the population.  
As a result, water service is generally “irregular” in areas where there are squatter 
settlements or disputes about land ownership; this means that the residents must depend on 
deliveries from tank trucks, either private or public, or even worse, by taking untreated 
water from local rivers, or irrigation and sewage canals. The cost of water supplied by the 
tankers is several times more than that delivered through the water mains.  
But this description does not do justice to the magnitude of problems facing the 
people in these districts. Those without regular access to water generally are not served by 
sewage lines. As a result, the problems of quality of life are magnified. But in recent 
months (summer-autumn 2005), the significance of this lack of infrastructure was 
dramatically brought home by the differential impacts of the hurricanes on people in the 
affected areas. Although the effects of the storms was widespread, and initially affected 
people from all walks of life, the lasting effects and the depths of the destruction of 
generally far greater in the areas without sewage systems or storm drains; although 
particularly notable in Chiapas, the most serious human impacts in Cancún were also 
observed among the marginal communities settled along the edges of streams and on the 
fringes of urban areas.  
C. The capacity of balancing demand and supply among distinct 
social user groups  
As described above, the NCW and the IWRM approaches lead to an analytical focus on the 
way in which the various stakeholders are managing the allocation of water resources 
within watersheds and among them, in the case of areas that are beneficiaries or losers in 
the interbasin transfers. The institutional framework in place in Mexico makes it 
particularly difficult to administer this balance, since several agencies with markedly 
differing competencies are responsible for specific facets of the planning, allocation, 
conservation, and management process in each watershed. Although the CNA is generally 
accepted to be the institutional figurehead responsible for the regulation of the system 
(Dourojeanni, Jouralev, and Chavez 2002), an evaluation of its practical operation belies 
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this version. In fact, responsibilities for water resource management in Mexico are so 
dispersed that it is fair to say that any attempt to develop a reasonable diagnosis of 
hydraulic balances, and an approximation of the pressure points that would have to be 
controlled if the present patterns of overexploitation that characterizes virtually all 
underground water sources were to be brought into compliance with national standards.  
All three of Mexico’s major metropolitan areas are presently confronting varying 
degrees of crisis in their water supplies. Mexico City imports about 30% of its total 
consumption, although it is generally agreed that if adequate provision were made for 
capturing rain water and storing it or injecting it into the aqueous subsurface structures, the 
valley would be able to supply its own needs without resort to the massive water transfers 
that are the source of inter-regional problems. Monterrey’s problems are more serious, 
since it is located in the semi-arid northern region, forcing the state water agency to import 
substantial volumes from neighboring watershed in adjoining states. Guadalajara, Mexico’s 
third largest metropolis, faces even more complex problems because it must reconcile its 
needs with those of a number of other states, commercial agricultural interests, and rich 
industrial cities that depend on the same water resources; uncontrolled effluents from 
industrial parks where textile and chemical plants render surface water unusable, force the 
city to draw from the nation’s largest lake, Chapala, in anticipation of approval for a dam to 
collect sewage waters for reuse in the metropolitan area,22 while nearby cities like Leon 
will increasingly depend on using water from the region’s rivers for their own survival.  
Some positive developments for confronting the imbalances were identified during 
our field studies. Two distinct innovations are being explored by local water agencies: the 
acquisition of water rights from rural producers with permits to extract water from aquifers 
and the transfer of concessions to use clean water to the cities in exchange for the use of 
treated residual effluents. Neither of these developments is proceeding smoothly, as best 
illustrated by the case of San Luis Potosi. An intermediate sized industrial city, centrally 
located on a principal access route to the United States, the local water agency offers an 
example of attempts at institutional and technical innovation. It is one of only a few that has 
successfully merged several municipal agencies into a single metropolitan company, 
responsible for urban water and sewage management (Interapas). In one of its first 
proposals for confronting the heightening crisis of supply in a semi-arid area, the 
administration proposed a seemingly straight-forward exchange of underground water 
rights for treated water from a new sewage system for the cooling system of the 
thermoelectric plant operated by the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE); the agreement 
suffered a tortured birth even after an acceptable price for the treated water was agreed 
upon, because the CFE stalled in implementing the agreement in response to administrative 
fears about the liability of the people making the decisions and the lack of sufficient 
information about possible minor technical problems associated with the arrangement. The 
program of letting concessions out to a private company to build sewage treatment plants in 
the San Luis Potosi area was also predicated on the assumption that the water authority 
would be able to oblige the local farming communities to accept the treated water for their 
irrigated fields; this assumption has proved illusory, because the farmers had previously 
negotiated a presidential decree granting them unlimited access to the untreated sewage 
water. This facet of the program was still the target of acrimonious conflict at the end of 
                                                 
22 Approval for this dam is being vigorously contested by local citizens’ groups and national environmental 
organizations. They have been effective in stalling the project for several years. 
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2005, and is symptomatic of a widespread problem facing the water sector in Mexico: the 
inability of existing administrative structures to effectively manage water allocations 
because of the complex set of entitlements that have been distributed to competing 
claimants since the promulgation of the 1917 Constitution, or even some who have 
inherited water use rights that predate the Mexican Revolution.  
These attempts by Interapas are a precursor of a wide variety of initiatives that are 
being designed and promoted throughout the country to attempt to confront the growing 
imbalances between supply and demand in all parts of urban Mexico. They might be more 
generally assembled under the broader rubric of the development of water markets. The 
CNA, together with the World Bank, has been pressing for more serious consideration of 
ways to institutionalize procedures for transferring water rights that, up to now, have been 
exchanged through a series of informal negotiations or purchases by local water agencies as 
well as by private parties.VV23 They have convened seminars and technical panels to 
explain and train agency experts in the inner workings of the procedures that might be used 
to begin to negotiate the sharing of access to different water sources or the actual purchase 
of well rights; implicit in this process is the ultimate threat of the exercise of the powers of 
the state to exercise its rights of eminent domain, a drastic step that has frequently led to 
violent protest in the past. 
D. The structure of fees, subsidies, spending, and investment  
All of the people concerned with the urban water sector in Mexico are aware of the 
financial problems related to its operation. Less than one-half of the people connected to 
urban water services actually pay their bills, while many others are not even invoiced. 
Tariff structures reflect a wide variety of criteria for charging for the service, and although 
the principle of charging more (per cubic meter of water used) for higher consumption 
levels is widely accepted, less than one-third of the households with service have 
functioning water meters. For those households that pay their bills, most water service is 
billed at a flat fee for each water connection; in those few of areas where metering is 
effective and service is monitored, the unit costs of water increase markedly with increasing 
consumption (Table 5 – appendix I, page 40).24
The CNA has developed a program for encouraging the local water agencies to pay 
for the water they extract from their aquifers and to improve their collection practices. 
Called Promagua, the program promises to return bulk water fees paid by the agencies to 
the federal government for their consumption if they develop programs to improve their 
infrastructure for distribution (reduce leakage and increase pressure in the lines) and install 
meters and develop effective measurement and billing systems. This program, strongly 
supported by the World Bank, is based on the assumption that consumers will begin to be 
more responsible about their use of the resource, if their bills more closely reflect the 
volume they consume.  
                                                 
23 Perhaps the most widespread use of the purchase of rural water rights has occurred in the northern state of 
Sonora, where arid conditions has intensified pressures on the urban and state-wide water agencies to confront 
frontally the imbalances. One collaborator in this research, Nicolás Pineda, reported on the experiences in the 
Hermosillo metropolitan area in this regard (also see Pineda 1999). 
24 The table may be slightly deceiving, since virtually no residential consumer will fall into the upper levels of 
monthly consumption. Similarly, the minimum levels –suggesting higher unit costs for very low levels– are 
usually below the minimum threshold for household consumption, which is usually between 10 and 20 m3 per 
month. 
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In all of the water systems in Mexico heavy subsidies are required to finance their 
operation. In the best publicly-managed agencies, including Monterrey, León, and Tijuana, 
and in the privately administered systems, current revenues generally cover operating 
expenses and normal maintenance; in most other jurisdictions, even the day-to-day 
operations require regular injections of funds from municipal and state budgets to cover 
costs. Investment costs for extending the system and for major modernization projects are 
paid for from public investment, generally provided by the federal government. It is 
expected that the three private companies (Aguascalientes, Cancun, and Saltillo) should be 
able to absorb these costs as part of their long-term commitment to operate the systems; this 
assumption has generally not proven to be feasible.  
Another major issue that is a matter of ongoing conflict for water service is the 
responsibility of private developers to provide the infrastructure for their new settlements. 
In general, it has always been assumed that the infrastructure serving low-cost housing for 
poorer groups would be paid for from public funds, in order to make the housing more 
accessible, but in recent years, as private builders have taken advantage of developing 
capital markets to expand into this market, the pressures on municipal government has 
resulted in ever smaller housing units (now sometimes as small as 45 m2 or 400 ft2) with 
inadequate provision for basic urban services and open spaces. At the other end of the 
social spectrum, the political power of the wealthy is often effective in transferring 
responsibility for (high-quality) urban services to local government at the expense of other 
budgetary priorities; this was repeatedly commented upon in our interviews in Michoacan 
and Queretaro, although other respondents agreed that the practice was widespread.  
E. The implications of the system in terms of income distribution 
The considerations offered in other parts of this analysis make it clear that the present 
structure and functioning of the urban water management system in Mexico operates in a 
systematically regressive fashion. There are a number of different planes on which this 
process operates so that corrective measures can not be easily implemented. The first and 
most obvious is the monetary cost of obtaining adequate supplies of quality water for 
domestic needs. Although the tariff structures in those jurisdictions that have metered 
supplies are generally progressive, the poorest groups still pay a greater proportion of their 
incomes for water service than does the rest of the population. Because the settlement 
patterns in many Mexican cities has relegated lower income groups to the outer fringes, 
frequently in squatter settlements and often along the banks of drainage or irrigation canals, 
without the ready possibility of land titles. In these areas the local governments are hard 
pressed to extend the local infrastructure to provide regular service to these communities; 
as a result they are forced to resort to water delivered by water trucks – tankers that bring 
water in from generally unsupervised supply points; in some areas, and in some moments 
(especially around local elections) local authorities will contract for these services, but 
generally the people are forced to pay for them on their own, in unregulated markets where 
collusion often raises the prices far beyond the truckers’ costs or the prices charged to more 
fortunate groups connected to the mains.25
                                                 
25 Another source of inequity is the high charges for new connections reconnections in the case of late 
payment of bills. These fees have gone up much faster than other costs as they are not as easily regulated and 
are less visible than the water rates themselves. We documented numerous reports of grievances in this regard 
in both Saltillo and Mexico City. 
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But the distributive impacts extend far beyond the problem of the high cost of the 
liquid. Since the quality of water also differs greatly among socio-economic groups, the use 
of substandard supplies leads to one of the major problems in Mexico: water borne disease, 
such as gastrointestinal illness, are the most common ailments, but the list of effects 
extends much further, to debilitating and life threatening problems such as cistercercosis, 
the result of untreated water being used for irrigation of fruits and vegetables or infecting 
the water supplies of animals that are subsequently slaughtered for human consumption. A 
related problem is the contamination of aquifers from natural causes (e.g., arsenic from 
geological formations that are drawn into the water supply as aquifers are overexploited) or 
anthropogenic sources (e.g., organochlorides from pesticides) that then are concentrated 
along the food chain, creating new sources for disease. While some of these processes are 
uniformly spread among the population (at least 20% of Mexico’s milk supplies are tainted 
in this manner), it is the poorer segments, which are most vulnerable because of their 
poorer nutritional standards, and which ingest a disproportionate share of the contaminants, 
suffering the greatest effects from both the illness and the social and economic costs of 
treating their problems; of course, within each social group, it is the women who bear the 
heaviest burden from these problems because of their preponderant role as caretakers 
(Bennett 2005). Of course, the lack of water treatment facilities further aggravates the 
problems, distributing the induced epidemiological effects in a highly unequal fashion, both 
socially and geographically.  
On another level, large proportions of the population with marginal service through 
institutional channels, who do not enjoy publicly provided infrastructure and regular 
sources of water, have no choice but to organize themselves to provide this vital input. Self-
built and locally managed water systems are quite common in smaller towns and villages 
where municipal authorities are incapable of providing even minimum services.26 In many 
of these groups, local boards are organized to provide water services by imposing 
connection fees and water use charges, administering the system as best they can; these 
systems, however, often further exacerbate local inequities and tensions, conditioning water 
supplies to exorbitant costs on outsiders and political or ethnic minorities.  
But perhaps the greatest source of inequity derives from the highly regressive 
structure of local government finance and the way in which federal monies are distributed. 
Local revenues are generally derived from property taxes that are highly regressive in their 
application and value added taxes have the same distributive impact. Elite recruitment and 
apportionment systems during the election process exacerbate the problem by creating 
obligations for public expenditures and patronage to the wealthy and politically influential 
at the expense of the priorities of socially marginal groups.  
The cumulative impact of these processes has created a national water management 
system that is inadequate and socially discriminatory. Although water is vital for existence, 
until it is provided in adequate quantities and of sufficient quality, the supply and effluent 
systems themselves will continue to be an additional source of profound inequalities.  
                                                 
26 Recent initiatives to build small-scale and modular water treatment plants to provide a new source of safe 
water for productive purposes is still operating on too small a scale to be socially relevant. 
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F. Environmental impact in source areas, and the state of the 
aquifer  
Another of the serious problems confronting Mexico as a whole is the rapid degradation 
and depletion of its aquifers. The approach of the NCW that establishes clear priorities on 
competing uses for the water and the lessons of IWRM that insists on the integrated 
consideration of all sources and all users in a single allocation system is clearly not possible 
in Mexico, where different public agencies are responsible for particular facets of the 
system, without any coordinating or regulatory body to oversee the process.  
A notable example of the problems created in this process is the participatory 
network of councils that were created to manage watersheds throughout the country. These 
councils are supposed to be democratic bodies in which conflicting interests could be 
reconciled through negotiation or even by exchanging water rights, a sort of make-shift 
market based approach to local problem solving. These councils, like most other 
participatory institutions in Mexico, proved to be anything but democratic, becoming 
instead mechanisms for the vertical transmission of orders or for local land and water 
management for the benefit of the major economic, political, and bureaucratic interests in 
each region; even worse, at the national level, these bodies were defined to include only 
representatives of water users, and therefore could not be expected to include the 
substantial numbers of people living in the regions of the headwaters of the river systems or 
even above them, whose daily activities directly impact on the way in which water can 
become available in the lower reaches of the basin (Barkin 2001).  
The CNA continues to focus on the problem of satisfying demand without regard to 
mechanisms for limiting use or making choices among alternative demands. Water use 
supervision is widely dispersed among all three levels of government, and reflects the long 
standing constituencies that have carefully protected their fiefdoms over the course of past 
decades. Contrary to prevailing opinion in administrative and political circles, it seems 
quite unrealistic to expect this large and technocratic bureaucracy to be able to make the 
necessary adjustments that would allow it to become an expert manager and neutral party in 
evaluating the best interests of the nation.  
G. Sewage treatment and downstream impact  
Although the CNA pays lip service to the need for sewage treatment facilities and the 
“polluter pays” principle, its approach to the problem suggests that the country is still far 
from finding viable solutions, given the magnitude of the task facing the nation. There are 
numerous examples of intervention by the agency that actually impede further progress 
towards a national solution. Our interviews and field research indicate that a single 
engineering paradigm dominates –based on an industrialized approach using activated 
sludge as a way of deactivating noxious biological activity. As a result, design solutions are 
generally based on the construction of self-contained water treatment plants that combine 
and concentrate domestic and industrial wastes into a single viscous effluent that often must 
be considered to be toxic. At present, only about 18% of residual waters from urban water 
supply companies pass through treatment plants, and it is officially reported that less than 
one-half of these are actually in operation because the responsible local authorities lack the 
financial means to pay their costs or the technical resources to assure their proper 
maintenance.  
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There are innumerable examples of plants that are under construction, that have 
already been let out for bid or which are in design phases that illustrate this tendency. In 
Saltillo, the spatial separation of residential areas from heavy industrial activity as well as 
the topography of the area would have lent itself particularly well to a project design that 
separated the different effluent flows using appropriate design technologies for each 
sewage source; instead a single system was contracted for, combining the two waste flows 
and leading to a process that will be more costly and less susceptible for recycling of the 
treated water because the combined facility is to be located at a lower altitude than would 
have been possible with alternative proposals; local experts consider that final design 
solution was strongly influenced by private sector pressures from the local industrial group 
that already operates a small water treatment plant and will probably be able to siphon off 
part of the water from the new system for use in its own installations and for resale to other 
industrialists. In Morelia, another large scale plant under construction will produce an 
effluent that is unsuitable for use in the irrigation district adjoining the plant which 
produces dairy products and produce for the metropolitan area; when questioned about the 
decision not to use a modular design so that some of the waste stream be siphoned off into 
smaller passive plants using anaerobic bacterial processes and/or to raise the standard of 
treatment so that the water could legally be used for irrigation, local social groups were 
brushed off as being uninformed of the complexities of the problems involved or told that 
the problem was the unwillingness of the local farmers to pay for the treated water, given 
that the present underground water sources they use is virtually costless.  
Examples of opposition to innovative technologies and models of social 
organization abound. In the Villahermosa metropolitan area, the country’s largest treatment 
plant using a technology of “artificial wetlands” was actively opposed by the CNA, which 
preferred a more traditional design based on chemical treatment of sludge; the alternative 
design (with lower construction costs than the alternative) was approved in a political 
process by the state government and that plant was built and is operating with costs for the 
first year almost 30% below original estimates; ironically, during the regional workshop 
convened by the CNA in preparation for the IV World Water Forum to be held in Mexico 
in March 2006, regional CNA officials participated in a tour to explain the innovative 
features of the plant along with state supporters, attributing the initiative to the “close 
collaboration” between local and national government agencies. A less fortunate outcome 
came from a proposal for using a pilot project design for treating residential effluent in the 
border town of Ojinaga, Chihuahua. In this case, agronomists had worked for several years 
with local citizen groups to plant some 300 hectares of trees resistant to the high salinity of 
the arid, desert-like conditions and build the drainage system required to transport sewage 
form the city to the new forest; the experiment produced an effluent that exceeded 
international standards for returning water to the Rio Grande (Bravo). Several years later, 
however, when bids were called for a full-sized treatment facility, the design was rejected 
by the international border commission (dominated by CNA) as being “too experimental.”  
Smaller plants for towns and suburban communities are also on the official agenda, 
as amendments to the national water law require their installation in the coming years. Here 
too, the technical bias in favor of technology that produce industrial sludge has virtually 
proscribed the use of “softer” technologies that are less expensive to build and can be 
operated by the communities themselves. One experience in the state of Oaxaca that 
employs innovative financing mechanisms and relies on a high degree of local participation 
in construction and operation overcame skepticism from regional CNA officials because of 
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the charismatic and technical capacities of the managers and strong political support from 
state government.27 This experience offers some insight into the structure of official 
opposition to more innovative approaches, showing that mid-level technicians responsible 
for evaluating new proposals are reluctant to approve new approaches whose failure might 
endanger their own careers within the agency, and who don’t perceive any personal or 
institutional benefit from approving solutions that are more efficient, more environmentally 
friendly or less costly; since the operating costs and technical efficiency of the plants once 
they are operational are not standards by which individual performance in the CNA is 
evaluated, the personnel have little incentive to join the battle to support proposals that 
would have to run the gauntlet of bureaucratic opposition and commercial lobbying from 
the traditional bevy of contractors committed to the tried and proven (albeit unsuitable and 
operationally ineffective) systems.  
The CNA remains adamant in its opposition to technologies that are being supported 
by smaller international aid agencies as well as by environmentalists in other parts of the 
world. It has not made substantial financial or technical investments in appropriate 
modular, small-scale technologies that are more readily (self) financed by local 
communities and more suitable for the widely varying ecosystems that characterize the 
country. This opposition to new technologies is joined by the numerous farming 
communities growing fruits and vegetables for nearby urban areas, since the more 
expensive and complicated traditional approach has delayed construction of many sewage 
treatment plants. This rural constituency uses the untreated urban waste streams for 
irrigation, in direct contravention of national sanitary regulations, as a source or water and 
nutrients for their crops; in one particularly egregious example, the farmers actually 
financed the construction of the drainage system in Zamora, Michoacan, to channel the 
effluents directly to their strawberry fields; no less reprehensible from an epidemiological 
perspective, is the systematic management of residual waters from Mexico City in the 
neighboring state of Hidalgo, where they flow untreated into a large dam or directly into the 
fields where grains as well as fruits and vegetables are cultivated for sale in the capital city.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
We began this evaluation with the presentation of an analytical framework in which the 
new culture of water leads to an emphatic call for a regulatory structure that encompasses 
an integrated evaluation of the water system as a whole. In this context, there is general 
international agreement that any management scheme requires the holistic consideration of 
all of the available water resources, including the systems for ecosystem management to 
protect the environment and most especially the aquifers, as well all of the claimants of this 
water –domestic, industrial, agricultural and public service – including the environment 
itself as a legitimate, although voiceless, stakeholder. The field work was framed to respond 
to a growing concern in Mexico and elsewhere about the ability of different institutional 
models to adequately respond to the challenges of designing and operating urban water 
systems that could adequately respond to the challenges of assuring universal service within 
the constraints of protecting the ecosystems on which they presently depend and assure 
their availability for future generations.  
                                                 
27 This experience was described in detail in one of the regional preparatory workshops, leading up to the 
World Water Forum mentioned in the text, held in autumn 2005 in Oaxaca. 
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The Mexican system is clearly unprepared to meet these challenges. In virtually every 
aspect of the operation of the system the research found that the institutions had not even 
formulated their responsibilities in such a way as to facilitate advances in meeting even 
short term goals. Technological and institutional assumptions are proving erroneous, the 
basic data needed for evaluation, accountability, and planning are missing, and inadequate 
systems of financial control and revenue collection further complicate the management 
tasks. We summarize those failings in these eight points:  
 1) On the whole, the national water system offers wide disparities in the volume and 
quality of water available to different social groups, with disturbing inequities that 
oblige the poor to pay substantially more for service, or to expend more effort to 
ensure access. Compounding this problem are the seriously deficient service 
standards that systematically penalize the poor on many different levels: because of 
inadequate water quality, they suffer disproportionately from water borne diseases 
that take a greater toll because of accompanying indices of malnutrition and low 
educational and cultural levels; because of discriminatory regulatory systems and 
unscrupulous market operators, they live in areas that are more difficult to service 
and for which administrative systems are unprepared to attend.  
 2) The information on which descriptions of the operation of the water management 
system in Mexico is based is seriously flawed. Basic concepts are not precisely 
defined and there are inadequate technical and institutional means for collecting and 
systematizing this information.  
 3) Many local water agencies lack basic metering systems. They do not know how 
much water they extract and process, and/or cannot estimate the volumes they 
deliver to their customers. Virtually no system can accurately describe effluent 
flows or total extractions from the aquifers, since several government organizations 
are charged with responsibility for supervision. Many wells have been drilled and 
operate without proper permits and most of those registered with the authorities are 
withdrawing volumes of water far above their authorized levels.  
 4) Financial controls are notably lax. In all but the largest systems, local record 
keeping and fee collection systems are based on manual record keeping without 
systems for determining compliance and commercial effectiveness. Local officials 
regularly intervene to condone debts for influential individuals or groups, and 
political pressure is easily applied to ensure service and side-track administrative 
efforts to collect outstanding bills.  
 5) Inadequate urban development programs and disorganization facilitate the 
proliferation of new residential developments without consideration for 
infrastructure needs or provision for basic urban services. Even in the wealthiest 
urban areas, these initiatives frequently proceed on the assumption that services will 
be delivered later in response to social and political pressures, regardless of the 
technical and environmental constraints.  
 6) Fiscal problems and cultural patterns have created a heritage of low levels of 
sewage treatment and the widespread use of effluents for irrigation in discharge 
areas. In some cases, the farmers themselves have built or improved the drainage 
systems that channel these waters to crops that benefit from the fertilizing benefits 
of the sludge, regardless of the public health consequences.  
 7) Regulatory and administrative vacuums place responsibility for the management 
of rainwater runoff in the purview of public works departments rather than with the 
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water management authorities. As a result, there is virtually no provision for urban 
storm sewer infrastructure in the country, with the result that seasonal rains 
regularly wreak havoc throughout the country, with very high material and social 
costs that are widely lamented and irresponsibly disregarded because they are 
categorized as “natural disasters.”  
 8) Similarly, responsibility for some environment management problems is located 
in other agencies –the Secretariats for the Environment and Agriculture– while 
urban development has been shifted to the local levels. As a result, the water 
agencies generally assume no responsibility for programs like rainwater harvesting, 
land and water conservation, aquifer monitoring, etc. that might prove to be 
environmentally, socially, or financially attractive alternatives to constructing new 
aqueducts or dams for local water supplies.  
 
One central concern of students of urban water management is whether the advocates of 
varying models of privatization are correct in arguing that they can respond to the 
deficiencies that have become patently clear in evaluations of public sector operations. In 
this regard, our study has also raised serious misgivings about the possibilities of an easy 
solution. The enthusiasm of the international financial institutions to finance private sector 
solutions has proved misplaced in numerous examples around the world, including both 
developing and developed countries; some of the large international water management 
companies are reducing their plans for expansion and even withdrawing from difficult or 
sensitive areas, such as the case of Puebla in Mexico or Suez in other parts of Latin 
America.28 28
In Mexico, only three cases of privatized management of entire water systems have 
emerged, although there are numerous instances of concessions to operate individual parts 
of the process, as is the case of fee collections and local maintenance Mexico City and 
sewage treatment plants in many other parts of the country. Although each of these cases 
reveals some important advances in the installation of modern management systems and 
technical innovations that improve operating efficiency, none have emerged as 
unquestioned successes in demonstrating the superiority of their approaches; numerous 
problems of contract violations in one case and institutional barriers to assuring universal 
service are aggravated by the systematic disregard for the long-term environmental 
questions related to assuring adequate service in a healthy relationship with the surrounding 
ecosystems. Similarly, in a few outstanding cases, public sector companies have proved 
able to implement important innovations that have transformed these areas into models of 
professional management; but all of these cases also present problems of serious disregard 
for the environmental damage occasioned by present operations and none have made 
adequate provision for remedial actions that might postpone or avoid an impending crisis. 
In contrast, in a few instances local citizen groups have implemented innovative solutions 
that do offer to confront the long-term environmental challenges of water management; 
they have done so in the face of staunch political opposition and point the way to new 
models of citizen participation in the design and implementation of new management 
                                                 
28 Of course, there are also numerous examples of cities where their contracts have been cancelled. The 
spectacular public uprisings in Cochabamba and La Paz in Bolivia, the difficult history of privatized service 
in Buenos Aires, and the expulsion from Tucumán, Argentina, are a few of the more notable examples in 
Latin America. 
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models; the centralized Mexican political system, however, opposes efforts to consolidate 
these experiences or to reproduce these models.  
Thus, our overview of the Mexican urban water management system does not offer 
any solace for politicians searching for ready solutions. We suggest that the country is 
aggravating its environmental crisis without building the necessary institutional or social 
framework within which it could begin to tackle the major tasks it faces in correcting 
existing problems and extending the system to provide service to the very large segments of 
society that are presently without.  
Although our findings reflect the weaknesses of the public sector, there is no 
evidence that the private sector can better overcome these obstacles. In Mexico, the 
principal problem of water management is the lack of any group or authority that has 
assumed responsibility for the overall management of water resources and the absence of 
mechanisms for actively incorporating all of the stakeholders in the allocation process and 
the application of a wide range of technologies in the solution of the whole panoply of 
environmental, technical, and social challenges facing the nation. 
The New Culture of Water shows the need for an integrated approach to water 
management, but Mexico lacks that. The centralized water authority that ostensibly 
oversees the sector from a systemic perspective, the CNA, is unable to fill this coordinating 
role. It lacks reliable information on the quantity of water in available in aquifers and 
watersheds. Relying on faulty data reported by urban water management authorities, it 
cannot adequately estimate the quantity of water withdrawn by agricultural, industrial or 
urban users, nor does it have the authority to effectively control those withdrawals at a 
watershed level, or even to regulate the discharge of wastewater back into watersheds and 
aquifers.  
Debates about the role of privatization in urban water management are 
fundamentally misguided because they are too narrow. Urban domestic water users make 
up a fraction of total water use; relatively wealthy farmers and industrial users are the main 
consumers of water. Furthermore, the emphasis on pricing and the profit motives of private 
firms cannot encompass the issues of the environment as a legitimate water user, nor can it 
serve the large impoverished urban dwellers who lack stable incomes or property titles. The 
private vs. public debate obscures the pressing need to govern a much larger, integrated 
system with urgent social welfare goals, difficult social problems that preclude 
straightforward market solutions, environmental limits, and the need for socially-inclusive 
decision-making about how to meet those goals and respect those limits.  
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VIII. Data Tables  
TABLE 2: LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN: 
Indicators of Potable Water and Sewage Networks: 2003 
 
GNP/cap. Population Urban Pop Urban Areas National 
Coverage -- % Coverage -- % Country (US$/cap) 
2003* 
(000 
inhabitants) % Urban Potable 
Water Sewage 
Potable 
Water Sewage 
Haiti  412  8, 326 37.6  48.8  45.7  46.0  26.4  
Honduras  721  6, 941 55.5  93.8  93.9  80.9  70.2  
Guyana  730  765 37.6  98.3  97.2  92.9  84.7  
Nicaragua  820  5, 466 77.3  95.0  93.0  66.5  75.8  
Bolivia  939  8, 808 64.0  93.1  82.3  73.5  63.5  
Paraguay  1,235  5, 878 58.0  70.1  84.9  43.6  67.1  
Guatemala  1,574  12, 347 40.6  98.8  94.7  80.3  79.5  
El Salvador  1,760  6, 515 63.5  92.4  85.8  59.4  68.3  
Ecuador  1,855  13, 003 64.3  81.5  70.5  70.3  58.0  
Jamaica  2,055  2, 651 57.6  97.7  90.0  80.5  90.5  
Dominican R.  2,120  8, 745 67.1  96.0  95.6  87.6  89.5  
Colombia  2,352  44, 222 76.5  98.0  97.0  90.6  83.4  
Peru  2,431  27, 167 73.9  86.8  89.5  75.4  73.7  
Venezuela  2,470  25, 699 87.6  84.6  71.1  83.1  68.6  
Dominica  2,877  79 72.0  100.0  86.0  92.7  77.9  
Belize  3,125  256 48.4  100.0  70.9  90.9  48.3  
Panama  3,466  3, 120 57.2  87.7  98.7  86.9  93.2  
Costa Rica  3,935  4, 173 60.6  99.6  88.8  95.0  93.5  
Brazil  4,182  178, 470 82.8  95.7  93.6  89.0  84.8  
Cuba  4,274  11, 300 75.9  98.3  97.0  92.9  93.8  
México  4,682  103, 457 75.0  94.5  87.0  86.5  72.5  
Uruguay  4,953  3, 415 92.5  98.2  95.4  97.8  94.4  
Chile  6,051  15, 805 86.6  99.1  93.3  94.2  93.4  
Argentina  6,601  38, 428 88.6  84.7  88.5  78.6  83.9  
Barbados  6,858  270 51.7  100.0  99.3  100.0  99.3  
* Constant prices for 1995  
Sources: 1) CEPIS: Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente. Web 
page: http://www.cepis.ops-oms.org/ (Data for 2003). Location: "Portales"; "REPIDISCA"/ 
"Servicios de Información"/"Indicadores Ambientales"  
2) ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2004.  
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TABLE 3: MEXICO: Evolution of Water and Sewage Coverage 1960-2000 
 
 1960 1970 1980 1990  2000  
Total population  34,923,12948,222,23866,365,92081,249,645 97,483,412
Urban population*  14,382,00023,828,00037,584,00049,345,000 59,419,766
% Urban population  41%  49%  57%  61%  61%  
Households  6,409,096 8,367,40012,074,60916,035,233 22,268,916
Access to Water  2,069,981 5,056,167 8,533,16412,729,987 18,973,116
% Access to Water 32%  49%  71%  77%  85%  
Inside the house  1,505,003 3,210,795 6,022,847 8,072,518 12,427,656
% Inside the house 23%  38%  50%  50%  58%  
Access to Sewage† 1,851,470 3,440,466 6,158,09510,202,934 16,126,800
% Access Sewage†  29%  41%  51%  62%  75%  
* Urban population refers to localities with 15,000 or more inhabitants.  
† Connected to public network or with septic tank.  
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática. Censos de Población y 
Vivienda. 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. (Mexico City: INEGI) (On webpage: 
http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/rutinas/ept.asp?t=mviv088&c=3406) 
Updated and modified from Pineda, 1999, p. 172.  
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TABLE 4  
Mexico, 2003: Basic Information 
BASIC INFORMATION EFFICIENCY 
Rainfall Water Supply Physical
Commer- 
cial Overall CITY 
Mm/year L/H/Day 
Revenue/
Service % % % 
Nat. Average  276 60  50  30  
Cadereyta  591 189 714 74  100  74  
Linares  591 201 763 74  100  74  
León  597 204 1,855 55  98  54  
Ecatepec  887 234  36  94  33  
Monterrey  591 249 2,075 75    
Guamuchil  766 276 716 73  76  56  
San Pedro  318 277  65  70  46  
Ciudad Victoria  766 283 1,434 67  86  58  
Cuahtémoc  418 285  56  85  48  
Culiacan Rosales 766 285  65  92  60  
Atlixco  1265 286  68  71  48  
Los Mochis  766 297  69  94  65  
Ciudad Mante  766 307 1,220 58  93  54  
Guazave  766 308 2,466 58  84  48  
Hidalgo  418 313  73  82  60  
Mazatlán  766 315  69  56  65  
Hermosillo  423 328 1,391 68  40  27  
Querétaro  554 335 1,757 45  68  31  
Heroica Nogales  423 338  74  39  29  
Veracruz  1484 346  69  46  31  
S.Miguel Allende  597 349  64  73  47  
Xalapa–Enríquez 1484 365 939 40  72  28  
Aguascalientes  450 370  42  92  38  
Torreón  318 397 165 46  89  41  
Ciudad Lerdo  500 415  37  75  28  
Puerto Vallarta  821 415 2,669 65  100  65  
Chihuahua  418 425 1,486 62  74  46  
Ciudad Acuña  318 456 927 48  59  28  
Albia  318 462  51  81  42  
Gómez Palacio  500 485  39  74  29  
Agua Prieta  423 488 1,209 67  52  35  
Tepic  1061 512 534 51  65  33  
Ciudad Obregón  423 635  57  54  31  
Ciudad Juárez  418  1,705 75  69  51  
Notes: Rainfall: Annual average for the state in which city is located (millimeters per year)  
Water Supply: Total water available to population measured in liters per person per day  
Revenues/service: Total income of water agency divided by number of service contracts  
Efficiency: Physical: Water invoiced divided by total water supplied  
Commercial: Water paid for divided by water invoiced  
Overall: Physical times Commercial  
Source: CNA. Apéndices, Situación del subsector agua potable y alcantarillado y saneamiento 
a diciembre de 2003. On web: http://www.cna.gob.mx . 
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TABLE 5: Tariff Structures in Mexico (ca. 2004) 
 
Consumption 
(m3/month) 
Cost 0 5  10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80  90  100 
Well-managed cities 
Total 16 20 41 88 179 279 397 529 670 816 969 1128Monterrey 
W/S $/m3 0.00 3.94 4.13 4.41 5.96 6.98 7.95 8.82 9.57 10.20 10.76 11.28
Total 48 48 54 157 245 357 468 608 741 911 1073 1234Leon 
W/S $/m3 0.00 9.60 5.36 7.83 8.17 8.92 9.35 10.13 10.58 11.39 11.92 12.34
Total 36 37 73 174 462 793 1131 1585 1863 2130 2396 2662Tijuana 
W/S $/m3 0.00 7.45 7.34 8.68 15.41 19.83 22.61 26.42 26.62 26.62 26.62 26.62
Total 25 34 48 75 120 241 374 607 704 801 897 994Mexicali 
W/S $/m3 0.00 6.74 4.77 3.73 3.99 6.03 7.48 10.11 10.05 10.01 9.97 9.94
Tourist Cities 
Total 49 49 49 109 169 228 288 416 543 670 797 925Acapulco  
W/S $/m3 0.00 9.80 4.90 5.44 5.62 5.71 5.76 6.93 7.75 8.38 8.86 9.25
Total 64 64 64 64 64 100 125 150 343 392 441 490Los Cabos 
W/S $/m3 0.0012.76 6.38 3.19 2.13 2.50 2.50 2.50 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90
Total 44 44 44 66 66 131 188 188 188 437 437 743La Paz  
Water $/m3 0.00 8.75 4.37 3.28 2.19 3.28 3.76 3.13 2.69 5.47 4.86 7.43
Total 86 86 86 86 86 134 170 206 244 282 321 360Puerto Vallarta  
W/S $/m3 0.0017.21 8.61 4.30 2.87 3.36 3.39 3.44 3.48 3.52 3.57 3.60
Total 25 25 25 47 70 105 139 200 242 334 383 490Mazatlan  
W/S (residential) $/m3 0.00 4.96 2.48 2.35 2.33 2.63 2.78 3.34 3.46 4.18 4.26 4.90
Total 46 46 46 69 103 153 192 260 304 740 833 925Manzanillo  
W/S (residential) $/m3 0.00 9.22 4.61 3.43 3.43 3.83 3.83 4.34 4.34 9.25 9.25 9.25
Total 37 37 37 41 78 93 148 202 313 423 534 644Cancun  
W/S (working class) $/m3 0.00 7.40 3.70 2.03 2.59 2.32 2.95 3.37 4.47 5.29 5.93 6.44
Mid-size Cities 
Total 99 99 99 99 99 101 102 104 340 342 344 606Naucalpan  
W/S (residential) $/m3 0.0019.73 9.86 4.93 3.31 2.52 2.05 1.73 4.86 4.28 3.82 6.06
Total 59 176 176 204 265 265 265 270 270 295 295 295Atizapan  
W/S (residential) $/m3 0.0035.29 17.64 10.22 8.82 6.62 5.29 4.50 3.86 3.68 3.27 2.95
Total 92 92 92 92 92 98 99 100 243 244 246 455Toluca 
W/S $/m3 0.0018.35 9.18 4.59 3.06 2.44 1.98 1.67 3.46 3.05 2.73 4.55
Total 14 25 37 59 176 410 527 558 707 855 1004 1152Querétaro  
Water (middle class) $/m3 0.00 5.03 3.66 2.97 5.87 10.25 10.53 9.30 10.10 10.69 11.15 11.52
Total 45 45 90 188 282 380 475 619 722 825 1055 1172Tlalnepantla  
W/S (residential) $/m3 0.00 8.96 8.96 9.41 9.41 9.50 9.50 10.31 10.31 10.31 11.72 11.72
Total 32 32 32 78 129 196 263 347 432 524 624 725Saltillo  
W/S (residential) $/m3 0.00 8.96 6.85 22.62 37.64 51.23 68.75 80.05 99.42 56.63 67.51 78.38
Total 45 45 45 52 106 180 265 380 512 694 807 957Huizquilucan  
W/S (residential) $/m3 0.00 9.07 4.53 2.62 3.54 4.49 5.30 6.33 7.32 8.67 8.96 9.57
Notes: W&S: water and sewage  
Sewage refers to a drainage system, not water treatment.  
Residential refers to 'comfortable' homes  
Source: Bal-Ondeo, through courtesy of Hugo Contreras, Director of Development 
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